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- 2010-4-17
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本帖{zh1}由 denis2587 于 2010-6-16 23:52 编辑
Reconciliation in Afghanistan
阿富汗和解之征
Outside the tent
帐篷之外
The government’s fraying unity
政府统合下的躁动
Jun 10th 2010 | KABUL
THE hope Hamid Karzai, Afghanistan’s president, nurtured for the huge gathering, or jirga, held in a vast tent in Kabul this month was that it would give him the national support needed to start a peace process with the Taliban. Instead, it prompted the resignations of the country’s hugely respected interior minister and spy chief and exposed serious disagreements about efforts at reconciliation with the insurgents.
阿富汗总统卡尔扎伊希望，本月在喀布尔大帐篷中举行的圣战集会，可以给予他必要的全国性支持，以开展同塔利班的和解进程。然而，这却导致了两位声名显赫的国家内政大臣和谍报机构领导辞职，同时还暴露了在同反叛者进行和解一事上存在的严重分歧。
Hanif Atmar, a trusted technocrat, was seen by many foreigners as Mr Karzai’s best minister. Amrullah Saleh, the chillingly efficient chief of the intelligence service, was also much admired by fellow spooks in America and Britain. Ostensibly, they resigned to take the blame for the failure to stop insurgents getting through security cordons around the venue, despite the presence of some 12,000 police and soldiers. The attackers fired rockets, some of which narrowly missed the tent where Mr Karzai was making his opening speech.
哈尼夫?阿特马尔这位可靠的政治论者，在许多的外国人看来，是卡尔扎伊最出色的大臣。阿富汗情报部门主管，雷厉风行的萨利赫也同样深受美英间谍们的推崇。表面上看，他们辞职是因为尽管动用了1万
2千军警驻扎防守, 却没能阻止反叛者通过要塞地的安全警戒线。示威者点燃火箭筒，其中一些几乎要射中在帐篷里面致开幕辞的卡尔扎伊。
Mr Saleh and Mr Atmar were called to explain themselves. Mr Karzai made clear he did not believe their account. He even suggested they were part of an American and British plot to wreck his peace initiative. The two men offered their resignations, which Mr Karzai accepted. When the world’s foreign ministers gather for a conference in Kabul in July, both main national-security posts may well be vacant.
萨利赫和阿特马尔先生被传讯为自己申辩。卡尔扎伊明确表示不相信他们的描述。他甚至暗示，他们二人是美英阴谋摧毁和平政策的一部分。卡尔扎伊接受了这二位递出的辞呈。当世界各国领导人7月齐聚在喀布尔召开的峰会时，两个主要的国家安全职位都将处于空缺状态。
However, in comments that are worrying for Mr Karzai’s peace initiative, members of Mr Saleh’s entourage say the president’s lack of confidence was only the “tipping point” for his resignation. They say that Mr Saleh has been deeply concerned for some time about Mr Karzai’s conciliatory approach to Pakistan—the old enemy, which Mr Saleh’s spies tell him essentially controls the Taliban. Hardliners, such as Mr Saleh, believe Afghanistan will win respect from Pakistan only by showing a bit of steel. For their part, the Pakistanis have long demanded his sacking.
然而，在对卡尔扎伊和平政策表示堪忧的置评声中，萨利赫的拥护者说总统缺乏信心是导致萨利赫卸任的{wy}引爆点。他们说，萨利赫的情报人员监测巴基斯坦，这个阿富汗的旧敌实控有塔利班人员,所以萨利赫先生一直以来都关心卡尔扎伊有关巴基斯的安抚政策。强硬派，比如说萨利赫，相信阿富汗只有采取强硬态度才能赢得巴基斯坦的尊重。对于巴基斯坦人来说，他们一直要求他的卸任。
Mr Saleh is said to believe that Mr Karzai, who like most of the Taliban (and many Pakistanis) is a Pushtun, a member of Afghanistan’s largest ethnic group, has softened towards Pakistan because he no longer thinks NATO can win in Afghanistan. Hence, in his view, Mr Karzai’s reluctance publicly to endorse the counterinsurgency strategy of General Stanley McChrystal, the American NATO commander.
萨利赫先生据说认为卡尔扎伊——这位和塔利班（还有很多巴基斯坦人）同宗同族的普什图人（阿富汗{zd0}族群成员），对巴基斯坦示好是因为他不再认为北约可以在阿富汗取胜。因此，在他看来，也就解释了为什么卡尔扎伊在面对北约总指挥，美国人斯坦利麦克克里斯特尔及他的反暴乱战略时，公开表现出了自己的迟犹未决。
Even more damaging in Mr Saleh’s eyes are compromises such as Mr Karzai’s post-jirga announcement of plans to release Taliban prisoners held on the basis of intelligence rather than hard evidence. Mr Saleh, whose organisation was responsible for locking up many of the prisoners, believes dangerous men will be freed.
在萨利赫看来，更大的灾难是卡尔扎伊的和解政策，比如说卡尔扎伊在后圣战宣言中表示可以释放一些有情报信息但没有确凿证据的囚犯。萨利赫负责囚禁众犯的机构，认为一些危险人物会被释放。
That Mr Saleh, who in the 1990s was a close aide to Ahmed Shah Massoud, a famous Tajik guerrilla and leader of the Northern Alliance against the Taliban, objects so strongly even to a confidence-building measure such as prisoner releases shows how difficult it will be to reach consensus on a negotiated settlement. After all, Mr Karzai did not go nearly as far as some proponents of reconciliation would have liked—offering insurgent leaders nothing in the way of provincial governorships, cabinet positions or constitutional change.
萨利赫先生，这位20世纪90年代艾哈迈德沙阿马苏德(塔吉克游击手，同时也是抗击塔利班的北方联盟军的领导人)的亲密副手, 甚至强烈xx信心建立计划。比如他指出在释放问题上，各方将很难达成一致的决定。毕竟，卡尔扎伊并没有像其他和解推动者那般尽其所能。比如说他并没给予反叛人士任何地方执政权力，也没有提供任何内阁席位或修宪权力。
The 1,600 delegates to the peace jirga were meant to represent the whole nation. But most were picked by Mr Karzai’s appointees. Non-Pushtun power brokers, whose support will be vital for any consensus, stayed away: Abdul Rashid Dostum, an Uzbek leader; the runner-up in last year’s presidential election, Abdullah Abdullah, who is seen as a Tajik; Mohammad Mohaqiq, an ethnic-Hazara leader; and the Tajik governor of Balkh province, Atta Mohammad Noor.
参加此次和平集会的1600名与会者意味代表着整个国家。但是，他们中大多数是由卡尔扎伊所任命的。对于任何共识形成都至关重要的非普什图政治掮客被抛之度外了：比如乌兹别克领导人阿卜杜尔拉希德杜斯塔姆，还有去年总统大选中败北的塔吉克阿卜杜拉阿卜杜拉，哈扎拉族领导人穆罕默德莫哈奇克,外加上塔吉克巴尔赫省省长阿塔穆罕默德努尔.
As one leading politician puts it: “The risk is that we win the south just to lose the north”—ie, for every southern Pushtun welcoming rapprochement with the Taliban, a non-Pushtun in the north may be looking to dust off the AK-47 that has been sitting on the shelf for nine years now.
正如一名{zy1}的政治家坦言：问题在于我们是以牺牲北方来赢得南方的支持。比如，对于每一个欢迎与塔利班修好的南方普什图人来说，北方的非普什图人会磨刀霍霍，开始把目光投向那些已经置放9年的AK-47型战斗机了。 |
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