剑桥市——
欧洲已避免了眼下的金融危机。但是欧盟的将来以及欧元区的命运仍旧吉凶未卜。如果欧洲不能很快找到一个快速xx欧洲大陆经济的方法,那么它将注定要陷入多年的经济黯淡以及就“谁破坏了欧洲计划”进行无休止的相互指责。
在2009年遭受比美国还严重的经济崩溃后,欧洲的经济将要迎来更为缓慢的复苏——如果可以称它为复苏的话。国际货币基金组织预计今年欧元区的经济增长仅为1%,明年为1.5%,而美国的是今年3.1%,明年2.6%。据预计,即使是自上世纪90年代以来陷入大萧条的日本经济的增幅也将比欧洲大。
欧洲的债务问题以及外界对希腊等高负债欧盟国家的偿还能力的担忧,使得欧洲的经济增长受限。正当欧洲的私营经济进行去杠杆化,并尝试重建资产负债表时,消费和投资需求却因此垮了,而产出也随之崩溃。目前为止,欧洲的首脑们除了勒紧裤腰带外,没有其他方案来解决经济增长这一难题。
似乎事情的推理是这样的:经济增长需要市场信心,而市场信心则需要财政紧缩。正如安格拉·默克尔说的,“经济增长不能以堆高政府预算赤字为代价。”
但是在内需低迷的情况下,试图匡正财预算赤字不但不能改善问题,还会使问题变得更糟糕。收缩的经济使得私有债务和公共债务看起来很难维系下去,这样并不能提高市场信心。
事实上,这引发了一个恶性循环:一国的经济增长前景越黯淡,就越需要财政匡正和去杠杆化让市场确信其潜在的偿还能力,但是财政匡正和私有经济去杠杆化的幅度越大,经济增长的前景也就越差。摆脱债务(尚未违约的){zh0}的方式就是通过经济增长。
因此欧洲需要一个短期的经济增长战略,来配合财政支持一揽子计划和财政强化计划。实施这一战略的{zd0}障碍物就是欧盟的{zd0}经济体和公认的{lx}:德国。
尽管德国的财政和国际收支账户十分强劲,但它xx外界让它进一步提高内需的呼吁。它的财政政策一直是呈扩张性的,但是远远没达到美国的水平。自2007年来,德国的结构性财政赤字增长了3.8%,而美国增长了6.1%。
而反常的是,德国却有着巨大的经常账户盈余。德国2010年的盈余预计占国民生产总值的5.5%,接近中国的6.2%。因此德国必须感谢诸如美国或是欧洲的西班牙和希腊等赤字国。正是它们的消费支撑着德国的产业,防止德国的失业率进一步攀升。作为一个应该促进全球经济稳定的富裕经济体,德国不但没能作出应有的贡献,还搭了他国经济的便车。
正是德国的欧元区贸易伙伴们,尤其像希腊和西班牙那样经济严重受损的国家,为德国经济发展付出了最多的代价。这些国家总的经常账户赤字额与德国的盈余额几乎一致。(欧元区经常账户的总额与世界其他地区是持平的。)
当一国面对像西班牙、希腊、葡萄牙以及爱尔兰所陷入的危机时,传统的补救措施是实施财政紧缩和货币贬值。货币贬值能使经济快速提高竞争力,改善外部均衡,降低伴随财政收缩后的产量流失和失业率。但是作为欧元区的成员,它们无法使用这一xx的措施,而对欧元贬值的话,收效甚微,因为它们有很多贸易(将近50%)是与德国和其他欧元区成员进行的。
除此之外,它们能采取的措施就非常少了。国际组织和一些经济学家常常呼吁进行“结构性改革”。在这种背景下,“结构性改革”的意思是提高企业解雇职员的能力。不管这种改革可能会带来什么样的长期效益,它很难带来短期效益。当没有企业希望扩大职工队伍的时候,降低解雇员工的成本将不会大幅提高劳动力需求。
希腊和西班牙以及其他国家想要提高竞争力,除了退出欧元区这一办法之外,{wy}现实可行的选择就是全面降低公共部门职员的名义工资以及公共服务的价格。即使在{zj0}的条件下,实施这一任务也是艰难的。欧洲中央银行的低通货膨胀目标(2%)使这一任务几乎不可能完成。因为要达到这一目标值,工资和价格起码要降低10%。
德国不但拒绝提高内需和降低国际收支盈余,还让欧洲央行坚持保守的通胀目标,这些都严重地削弱了欧洲繁荣和团结的前景。这几乎毫无疑问会让希腊、西班牙以及其它有着巨大私有和公共债务的国家陷入多年的经济衰退和高失业率。这些国家很可能会在将来某个时候,选择对其外部债务进行违约,而不是继续承受痛苦。
德国的领导们可能在批评其他政府的挥霍时感到安慰。确实,一些政府,如希腊政府,在经济景气的时候堆积了巨大的财政赤字,从而危及它们的未来。但是西班牙和爱尔兰呢?两国的xx者都不是政府,而是私营经济。如果说别人举债太多,那是不是说明德国人放贷过度呢?
如果德国想要欧洲的其他国家吞下财政收缩这颗苦药丸,那么它最终将要认识到潜在的交换物:它必须承诺要提高国内支出,降低国际收支盈余,并且还要接受欧洲央行对通胀目标的上调。德国越早履行它这边的责任,对所有人就越有利。
Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2010.
www.project-syndicate.org
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A Win-Win approach to Rebalancing North and South Europe
Credit markets are demanding that Spain, Portugal and Greece reduce their external borrowing and current account deficits. Devaluation is not an option for Euro Zone members, so many economists are recommending that Spain, Portugal and Greece help local manufacturers become more competitive by forcing the private sector to cut nominal wage rates. But despite 20 percent unemployment, Spain’s private sector wages are not falling. Spanish manufacturing workers are already paid 40 percent less than German workers. Even cheaper workers are available in Eastern Europe (where wages are less than half the Spanish level) and in China where wage rates are about one euro per hour after recent strike settlements. Even if a 10 percent reduction in Spain’s private sector nominal wage rates were politically feasible, can we have any confidence this will fix the problem? I think not.
There is a Win-Win strategy that takes advantage of Spain, Greece and Portugal greatest assets—lots of sun, beaches and a significantly warmer climate (particularly during fall, winter and spring). According to the BBC climate web site, Stockholm, Copenhagen, Edinburgh and Berlin have only 1 or 2 hours of sun a day in November, December and January. Almeria, Barcelona and Palma Spain and Brindisi Italy, by contrast, have over four hours of sun and day-time temperatures that make outdoor living attractive. Instead of piling all of their vacation time into one long vacation in the summer, Northern European workers should be encouraged to schedule more vacation time in the winter.
Governments can induce such a shift by offering discounts on airfares and rentals for vacationing in southern Europe in the fall, winter and spring (outside of high season). School vacations could also be restructured.
Is the lender/borrower relationship in government accounts characterized by the same incentives to bubble as are financial markets? To me the past few years have made obvious the need for enforced moderation. If policy makers were to focus on moderating growth periods through the buildup of security funds for corrections, perhaps we could lessen the impact of financial and fiscal volatility. (or even simply the restriction of credit to some degree, after all it is all too obvious that during a boom over-leveraging is inevitable)
Moving forward I like the idea of lenders feeling pain for "excessive lending", but really there is an immense amount of capital flowing through global markets, where should it end up? My core question might be whether there is too much liquidity in the global market? As we saw with the Credit Crisis, investment assets are valued at hundreds or thousands of times the value of goods and governments are pumping more currency into them at prodigious rates. Is it possible that massive expansions in the monetary base could create asset bubbles without inflation in the price of goods? And is this what we've been doing for the past 20 if not 30 years?
Nico 04:52 10 Jun 10
I
agree with Rodrik, who, channeling Keynes, notes that these forms of crisis are just as much, if not more, to be blamed on those running large surpluses for sapping demand and causing the deficit country into a balance of payments crisis. The 'technocratic' solution is to follow the recommendations that Rodrik lays out: inflation, boosting domestic demand in Germany, etc., within the EU, to adjust the relative prices in the region to allow for the debtors to grow and inflate their way out of the crisis. However, the fundamental problem is that surplus countries, creditors, always have the upper-hand, as long as the debtors do not seriously consider default. I do not see Germany wiling to give up on its model anytime soon, woefully so, because their model depends on the "co-operation" of other European states. I think the lesson from Argentina was unequivocal: when faced with such a bind of total social collapse, it is better to default and leave the new 'cross of gold', because at then some economic and policy independence is regained and the costs are then placed on those who lent badly, as it should be.
www.perspectivos.blogspot.com